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SERGEI PROZOROV 
ONTOLOGY AND WORLD POLITICS: VOID UNIVERSALISM I 
PART I. THE WORLD AND WORLDS 
 
Chapter 1: Three Concepts of the World 
 
The Constitutive Ambivalence of World Politics 
 
The contemporary discourse on world politics in IR theory oscillates between the two 
extremes of unproblematic presupposition and skeptical denial. On the one hand, the 
studies of global governance, norms, regimes and institutions take as a point of departure 
the existence of a worldwide dimension of politics, which is then specified in various ways. 
According to this logic, which is at work in e.g. idealist, liberal and constructivist theories, 
the referent domain of world politics exceeds the state-centric realm of ‘international 
relations’ and permits to incorporate into the discipline such formerly ignored problematics 
as gender, culture or identity as well as such formerly ignored actors as social movements, 
indigenous peoples and other minorities. In this manner, politics moves from the narrow 
confines of the international society of states to the widest possible, presumably universal 
domain of the world as a whole (see Lipschutz, 1992; Linklater, 1998; Albert, 1999; Wendt, 
2003). On the other hand, realist approaches as well as critical orientations from neo-
26 
 
Marxism to post-structuralism, maintain their skepticism about the very possibility of 
attaining such a universal dimension of politics or remain wary of the hegemonic aspirations 
at work in any attempt to practice politics on a ‘world’ level (Calhoun, 2002; Rasch, 2003; 
Odysseos and Petito, 2007; Mouffe, 2009; Dillon, 1995, Edkins, 2000, Edkins and Pin-Fat, 
2005, Vaughan-Williams, 2009). While the debate between these two orientations has taken 
a myriad of forms throughout the history of the discipline (see Walker, 1993; Thies , 2002), 
what interests us is the status of the very idea of world politics, which oscillates between a 
presupposition that is so self-evident as not to merit a conceptual explication and a 
problematic phantasm, only accessible to thought in the form of a hegemonic pretension 
(cf. Walker, 2009: 20-28). We either do not need to know what world politics means, since it 
is ‘common knowledge’, or we cannot know it, since such knowledge is inaccessible, 
inconsistent or plain false. In this chapter we shall argue that this undecidable oscillation is 
due to the inconsistent concept of the world at work in the discourse on world politics in IR. 
We shall analyze three possibilities of conceptualizing the world and present the concept of 
the world as the void, which alone provides an ontological ground for overcoming the 
ambivalence of world politics in political and IR theory. 
 
This constitutive ambivalence of world politics may be illustrated with the help of two 
influential monographs on the subject, Jens Bartelson’s Visions of World Community (2009) 
and RBJ Walker’s After the Globe, Before the World (2009). Both of these works offer highly 
sophisticated meta-theoretical interventions into the discourse on world politics that 
nonetheless persist in the oscillation between presupposing and denying its very existence. 
For Bartelson, the problematic status of the concept of the world community in the 
disciplinary discourse has to do with the differential logic of identity that has been 
27 
 
constitutive of the discipline (Bartelson, 2009: 9-10). According to this logic, every identity is 
constituted by distinction from an ‘other’. Since a world community would lack such an 
other by definition, it is henceforth held to be impossible other than as a hegemonic 
imposture that claims for itself the universality it can never attain. ‘[As] long as we remain 
committed to this particularistic ontology, we will have a hard time making theoretical sense 
of any kind of human community over and above the plurality of particular communities 
presently embodied in the states system. As long as we regard the logic of identity as a 
predominant source of human belonging and identification, the formation of a community 
of all mankind will look highly unlikely because there are no human Others left that could 
provide it with a sense of sameness.’ (Ibid.: 42-43) In his historical analysis of the visions of 
world community from Dante to Kant Bartelson demonstrates that this logic of identity is a 
relatively recent invention and can therefore be overcome by a return to an earlier 
understanding of world community as a wider cosmological context, in which a plurality of 
human communities are always already embedded. 
 
[It] is not meaningful to distinguish categorically between communities of 
different scope, since all human communities derive from the same underlying 
and species-wide capacities. Human beings as well as the communities to 
which they happen to belong, are essentially embedded within a wider 
community of all mankind, within which the totality of human relations 
unfolds across time and space. (Ibid.: 11)  
 
This emphasis on embeddedness directs Bartelson’s attention to the cosmological visions, 
within which the ideas of world politics and world community have been articulated since 
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the Middle Ages. These visions escape the differential logic of identity by ‘positing a larger 
social whole within which all human communities are embedded and well as a vantage 
point over and above the plurality of individual communities , from which this larger social 
whole can be understood’ (ibid.: 20). Simply put, in order to break out of the pluralistic and 
particularistic logic of identity, it is sufficient to posit the world ‘as a universal and boundless 
phenomenon’ (ibid.: 43), within which all other communities as well as their individual 
members coexist. As a result of this move, the pluralistic logic of identity is brought back to 
its proper place within the overarching universality of the world community. Bartelson 
brilliantly demonstrates the way this logic of identity emerged as a result of a series of 
conceptual appropriations that he calls ‘nationalizations’, performed on the Medieval 
understanding of the world community as always already there, a ‘larger whole’ immanent 
to human existence as such (ibid.: 86-113, 167-170). While this appropriation has been 
remarkably successful both in theory and practice, it is possible to ‘restore the default 
settings of political thought’ (ibid.: 175) and reaffirm the world community no longer as an 
obscure telos of international politics, but as its very condition of possibility, something that 
is already here in the form of the presupposition, as long as human beings inhabit the same 
planet and share a common destiny. Yet, this reaffirmation ‘depends on its coherence and 
persuasiveness on the existence of a cosmological vantage point situated over and above 
the plurality of human communities and the multitude of individual human beings.’ (Ibid.: 
181) In order to inspire resistance to all ‘forms of authority that keep mankind divided’ 
(ibid.: 181), the idea of the world community must be grounded in a cosmological concept 
of the world.  
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Moreover, according to Bartelson, the relationship of grounding here is mutual: ‘[the] 
relationship between cosmological beliefs and conceptions of human community is 
contextual in character, insofar as knowledge of the former helps us make sense of the 
latter and vice versa. One of the challenges posed by the idea of world community is that of 
constructing a cosmology common to all mankind, so that all human beings will eventually 
come to inhabit the same conceptual world.’ (Ibid.: 12) In other words, our cosmologies of 
the world contextualize our conceptions of community and the other way round. Given the 
sheer diversity of cosmological visions of the worlds that Bartelson considers in his study, 
this argument cannot but appear paradoxical. If it is only in the context of a particular 
cosmology of the world that the concept of the world community can arise in the first place, 
it must logically be particular as well. We are thus back to the logic of identity, which, for all 
its historical contingency, ends up working even in the historical contexts where it was 
presumably absent. Having linked the concept of world community to the cosmological 
vision of the world, Bartelson must admit the historical plurality of ‘cosmological vantage 
points’ and is thus left with a myriad of particular figures of the ‘greater whole’, some of 
which admit of a world community more readily than others. While Bartelson does not 
identify with any particular historical cosmology and defers the question of the world 
community into the future when the ‘challenge of constructing a cosmology common to all 
mankind’ is successfully overcome, this deferral evidently does not resolve the question of 
what, if anything, could render this future cosmology more genuinely universal than its 
historical antecedents that, after all, also constructed worlds ‘common to all mankind’, 
which did not prevent the articulation of particularistic communities within them. 
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According to R.B.J. Walker’s After the Globe, Before the World, this is merely one of the 
aporias that await any discourse on world politics and make any invocation of a universal 
politics of the world highly dubious. Walker addresses the ways , in which numerous 
attempts to move from international relations to world politics remain caught up in what 
they try to transcend, i.e. the ontopolitical tradition of modernity, which is  itself already an 
attempt at resolving the antinomies, whose resolution we now associate with the idea of 
world politics (e.g. universalism/particularism, nature/culture, individual/community, etc.) 
(Walker, 2009: 54-94). The ‘seduction’ and ‘temptation’ of world politics belong to the very 
tradition of the ‘international’ as its inherent transgression, something simultaneously 
desired and held impossible, or perhaps desired precisely and only as impossible (ibid.: 24, 
83). For Walker, the question of world politics is always more difficult than it seems and the 
task of critical discourse is, in full accordance with Kant’s critical project, to guard its object 
against the illegitimate application of the powers of reason to it.   
                                                                                                              
Thus, any inquiry directed by Walker’s approach is only bound to take us further away from 
the knowledge of what world politics is, while enhancing our knowledge of why this 
knowledge is impossible. Wherever we are, we are always ‘before’ the world, facing it as 
distant and inappropriable. Universalist claims are always ‘[enabled] within a particular 
array of boundaries, borders and limits’ and a ‘politics of the world’ that promises to do 
away with those remains ‘necessarily beyond reach’. (ibid.: 257-258) Thus, ‘anyone seeking 
to reimagine the possibilities of political life under contemporary conditions would be wise 
to resist ambitions expressed as a move from a politics of the international to a politics of 
the world, and to pay far greater attention to what goes on at the boundaries, borders and 
limits of a politics orchestrated within the international.’ (Ibid.: 2-3, see also ibid.: 184-257) 
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While there are numerous possibilities for political experimentation at these liminal sites, 
we would do well to remember that this experimentation always takes place on this side of 
the borderline. Thus, while Bartelson seeks to ‘deproblematize’ the question of world 
community, trying to rid it of logical paradoxes by enfolding the problematic of community 
into an explicitly cosmological context and thus making the world the a priori site of any 
community whatsoever, Walker hypertrophies this question, making it practically impossible 
to exit the condition of the international at all. World politics thereby appears to be 
endlessly oscillating between being presupposed as self-evident and unmasked as 
impossible.  
 
It is easy to see that this perpetual debate cannot be restricted to the domain of ‘IR theory 
proper’, since it pertains to the conditions of possibility of the very disciplinary discourse of 
IR that necessarily remain inaccessible to this discourse (Foucault, 1989: 146-147). Nor may 
this debate be resolved within the domain of political science understood as the study of 
‘domestic politics’, delimited from the international realm. As Bartelson (1995) has 
demonstrated, the disciplinary discourses of political science and International Relations are 
constituted by the mutual exclusion of each other’s objects, whereby the positive 
delineation of political science is made possible by the delimitation of politics from the field 
of the international and its confinement inside the state, while the constitution of the 
discipline of International Relations is enabled by bracketing off the conditions of possibility 
of the very objects, whose relations this discipline investigates. Thus, the two domains of 
knowledge are ‘united in a symmetrical relationship to each other: each discourse  takes for 
granted exactly that which the other takes to be problematic’, the internal and external 
aspects of state sovereignty (Bartelson, 1995: 47). IR theory accords ontological priority to 
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the state, which implies the givenness of internal sovereignty as the defining property of the 
antecedently present entity. Conversely, political science has external sovereignty as its 
unproblematic foundation, whereby the origins of the state are explained away with 
reference to exogenous dynamics of the ‘international’, the state emerging in the course of 
consolidation of power through perpetual warfare.  
 
As long as the domains of political and IR theory remain constituted by what remains 
outside them, they can at best illuminate their own limits by pointing to each other’s blind 
spots. The overcoming of these limits requires a move to the level that precedes the very 
delimitation between inside and outside, external and internal, domestic and international, 
political science and IR. The question of world politics must be posed anew, no longer as the 
question of the possibility of the ‘domestication of the international’ in the form of the 
world state or the ‘internationalization of the domestic’ in the form of globalization, but 
rather as the question of a politics that precedes and exceeds this very distinction and has 
its locus and the source of its contents in the world as such. This question must therefore be 
relocated from the positive fields of knowledge, constituted by the prior division of the 
world into the domestic and the international, towards the ontological terrain, in which the 
being of the world as a domain of a possible politics may first be questioned.  
 
The move beyond the positive sciences of (inter)national politics entails that world politics 
may no longer be conceived in terms of the expansion of an already constituted domain of 
politics to a new, higher level or in terms of the articulation of new political content in the 
already constituted domain of the world. Both politics and the world must be problematized 
and redefined if the question of world politics is not to relapse into the familiar setting of  
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(inter)national politics. The question of world politics is not merely a question of a possible 
passage ‘beyond’ the international that necessarily presupposes it as a point of departure 
but abandons the international even as a presupposition, its only legitimate starting point 
being the world itself. Thus, the ontological inquiry into world politics must proceed in three 
steps. Firstly, we must elaborate the ontological concept of the world that may be a logically 
consistent ground of any possible politics. Secondly, we must define the notion of politics in 
general on the basis of this concept of the world as opposed to any distinctions drawn 
within this world. Only then, thirdly, we may pose the question of world politics as a mode 
of politics that fully corresponds to its own concept. In the remainder of this chapter we 
shall take the first step by focusing on three possible concepts of the world.  
 
The World as Everything 
 
Despite their diverging conclusions about the possibility of world politics and the world 
community, Bartelson and Walker appear to converge in the basic assumption about the 
sense of the ‘world’ in world politics. Bartelson’s world, which is already ‘behind’ us as an 
all-encompassing whole, within which we are embedded, and Walker’s world, which stands 
‘before’ us as an unattainable universality are indeed one and the same world, understood 
in the sense of the Whole, a cosmos, universe or totality, in short, everything. It is precisely 
this understanding of the world as the whole that accompanies the discourse on world 
politics from the very emergence of the IR discipline (see e.g. Morgenthau, 1948, chapters 
29, 30; Carr, 1981; Schmitt, 1976; Burton, 1972; Boulding, 1985). Whether or not one 
approaches world politics as already present or radically impossible, desirable or 
threatening, the world remains thought as the whole, the sum of all there is. Yet, what could 
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possibly be wrong with this understanding of the world as the universal totality, which, after 
all, seems perfectly in accordance with common sense? 
 
Let us posit the world as the whole, the sum of all beings.  Such a totality must by definition 
count itself among its members, otherwise it would not be the sum of all beings, since it 
would remain outside itself. The world as the whole is thus endowed with a property of self-
belonging. It should then be possible to divide it into two parts: the parts of the world that 
belong to themselves, such as the world itself, and the parts that do not, such as e.g. a set of 
five apples which is not itself an apple. Let us then assemble the latter parts into a group of 
all parts that do not belong to themselves – a perfectly legitimate and even banal grouping, 
given that most multiplicities that we can think of are precisely not self-belonging. Yet, 
despite the banality of the predicate, this grouping turns out to be problematic as soon as 
we pose the question of whether it belongs to itself. If it does, it must count itself among its 
elements, which are defined by the property of not belonging to themselves. Yet, if it does 
not belong to itself, it must also count itself among its elements, which, after all, compose 
all the parts that do not belong to themselves. Whatever answer we choose, we end up with 
inconsistency, hence we must revise our original assumption and affirm that the world as 
the sum of all beings does not exist.  
 
It is easy to recognize in this example a reformulation of Russell’s paradox which has been 
foundational for the formulation of axiomatic set theory in the early 20th century. Yet, how 
is set-theoretical logic relevant to the grand debates on world politics? After all, as 20 th 
century continental thought from Heidegger to Foucault demonstrated, the universalist 
claims of logic and mathematics are highly problematic, both of these discourses being 
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particular ‘regimes of truth’ among others. Yet, while the mode of thought inaugurated by 
set-theoretical logic might be particular, what is at stake in adjudicating its applicability to 
world politics is precisely what this particularity actually consists in. In Alain Badiou’s famous 
argument, set theory is in fact nothing other than ontology pure and simple, since it deals 
with being qua being and not any particular classes of beings, let alone their properties: 
being as such is nothing but pure multiplicity that can be adequately grasped by set-
theoretical axioms precisely insofar as they subtract being from the positive properties of 
beings (Badiou, 2005a: 4-16).  
 
Indeed, as long as we conceive of ontology in the rigorous Aristotelian sense as the study of 
being qua being rather than, in the currently widespread manner, as a fundamental 
worldview, social theory or even ideology (cf. Bosteels, 2010: 242), set theory offers the 
best paradigm of a theory of being as such as opposed to theories of particular beings or 
realms thereof. Sets are not a particular class of beings alongside others, e.g. human beings 
or social kinds, but rather the mode of presentation of all beings solely in their being 
(Badiou, 2005a: 23-30). For this reason, the axioms of set theory necessarily pertain to 
everything that is, including the entities of the international domain and the world as the 
result of their hypothetical totalization. To exclude these entities (be they states or persons, 
organizations or movements, etc.) from the field of application of set-theoretical axioms is 
simply to deprive them of being and reduce them to the status of simulacra, phenomenal 
apparitions without any ontological status. Yet, even if we were, if only for the sake of the 
argument, to assign the international domain to the status of a simulacrum, this would not 
help in removing the concept of the world from the zone of application of set-theoretical 
axioms. If the world is the whole, it must include not only the simulacra that are not but also 
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all that there is, i.e. all entities to which set theory does apply. In short, as soon as we pose 
the problem of the world in ontological terms, the set-theoretical argument on the 
inexistence of the whole appears not merely applicable to the discourse on world politics 
but of direct and paramount relevance to it. 
 
We may therefore conclude that concept of the world, understood in terms of cosmos, 
universe or totality, is ontologically inconsistent: the Whole has no being (Badiou, 2005a: 40-
42; 2009b: 109-111). We must emphasize that this claim does not merely concern the 
antiquated pre-Galilean conceptions of the closed totality of the cosmic order, whose crisis 
was addressed by Alexandre Koyre (1957) in his seminal work From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe. Our argument works as much for the ‘closed world’ as for the ‘infinite 
universe’. The inexistence of the whole is an ontological principle that is irreducible to any 
particular cosmology and rather throws into disarray the entire cosmological enterprise. 
While Bartelson (2009: 10-13) equates cosmological accounts of world community with 
what he terms ‘social ontology’, in our argument ontology rather serves as a stumbling 
block for any cosmology whatsoever. The consequence of Russell’s paradox is the 
impossibility of totalizing being as such, not the being of any particular world, including our 
physical universe: ‘The question of the limits of the visible universe is but a secondary 
aspect of the inexistence of the Whole.’ (Badiou, 2009b: 111) Thus, any cosmology is 
ontologically inconsistent, lacking any foundation in being. 
 
Every multiple being enters into the composition of other multiples without 
this plural (the others) ever being able to fold back upon a singular (the Other). 
For if all multiples were elements of one Other, that would be the Whole. But 
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since the concept of Universe inconsists, as vast as the multiple in which a 
singular multiple is inscribed may be, there exist others, not enveloped by the 
first, in which this multiple is also inscribed. In the end, there is no possible 
uniformity among the derivations of the thinkability of multiples, nor a place of 
the Other in which they could all be situated. The identifications and relations 
of multiples are always local. (Ibid.: 112) 
 
As Jean-Luc Nancy has argued in his Sense of the World (1997), the only plausible cosmology 
can therefore only be strictly acosmic: ‘there is no longer any world: no longer a mundus, a 
cosmos, a composed and complete order, from within which one might find a place, a 
dwelling and the elements of an orientation.’ (Ibid.: 4) And yet, this acosmism is not a 
matter of the deficiency of the contemporary or any other world but rather pertains to its  
very ‘worldhood’: ‘That there is not everything (or not the whole) does not define a lack or 
an ablation, since there was not any whole before the not-the-whole. It means rather that 
all that is (since there is really all there is) does not totalize itsel f, even though it is all there 
is.’ (Nancy cited in Morin, 2012: 45). For Nancy, the exhaustion of the myths of cosmos and 
mundus as universal totalities calls for the understanding of the world that does not 
presuppose the representation of its totality by the subject of cosmological reason:  
 
We do not yet have a cosmology adequate to this noncosmos, which, 
moreover, is also not a chaos, for a chaos succeeds on or precedes a cosmos, 
while our acosmos is neither preceded nor followed by anything: on its own, it 
traces – all the way to the confines – the contour of the unlimited, the contour 
of the absolute limit that nothing else delimits. But it is a cosmology of this sort 
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that we need, an acosmic cosmology that would no longer be caught by the 
look of the kosmotheoros, of that panoptic subject of the knowledge of the 
world, whose figure shed, in Kant’s work, for one last time, its last brief rays. 
(Nancy, 1997: 48. See also Nancy, 2007: 47) 
 
Moreover, contrary to the contemporary cosmologies of the ‘infinite universe’ we must not 
confuse infinity with universality. In fact, the key philosophical accomplishment of set 
theory is precisely its ‘desublimation’ of the question of infinity, which is approached as a 
property of a ‘local’ set and not of beings ‘as a whole’ (Badiou, 2008a: 100, 106-112). 
According to Badiou (2005a: 142-143), classical metaphysics combined the Greek 
understanding of the finitude of being with the monotheistic affirmation of divine infinity. 
The infinite thus pertained not to being-qua-being but to that being that was beyond being 
(God). In contrast, set theory not merely argues for the infinity of being or ‘nature’, which 
could easily be recomposed into the totalized figure of the infinite universe but also 
‘[proposes] the vertigo of an infinity of infinities distinguishable within their common 
opposition to the finite.’ (Badiou, 2005a: 146) Set theory affirms an infinite proliferation of 
different infinite quantities, making it possible to distinguish between ‘larger’ and ‘smaller’ 
infinities. ‘Three features – the infinite’s indifferentiation, its post-Cantorian treatment as a 
simple number and the pluralization of its concept (there are an infinity of different 
infinities) have all combined to render the infinite banal, to terminate the pregnancy of 
finitude and to make possible the assumption that every situation (ourselves included) is 
infinite.’ (Badiou 2008a: 100. Emphasis original.)1  
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Thus, the insistence on the infinity of the world has nothing to do with the conception of the 
world as the whole. Moreover, it is precisely because the world is infinite that it cannot be 
totalized into any figure of the whole without violating Georg Cantor’s theorem, 
foundational for set theory (see Badiou, 2005a: 142-160, 265-280). For any set whatsoever, 
it is possible to construct a set, whose elements are all the subsets of the original set, a so-
called ‘power-set’. We may easily intuit that this set would be quantitatively greater than 
the original set: e.g. the number of possible combinations of any three letters a, b and c is 
eight (a, b, c, ab, bc, ac, abc and finally the void set Ø, which is included as a ‘universal part’ 
of any set and which we shall discuss in detail below). Cantor’s theorem demonstrates that 
for infinite sets the size (or, in technical terms, cardinality) of this power-set is also greater 
than that of the original set, and, moreover, it is inaccessibly greater. It is impossible to 
measure the excess of the set of parts over the original set, which remains open to choice – 
it is possible to posit any infinite cardinal greater than that of the original set as the ‘size’ of 
its power-set (ibid.: 277-280).  
 
[We] know, since Cantor, that infinities are multiple, that is to say, are of 
different cardinalities – more or less ‘large’ like the discrete and continuous 
infinities – and, above all, that these infinities constitute a multiplicity it is 
impossible to foreclose, since a set of all sets cannot be supposed without 
contradiction. It is possible to demonstrate that, whatever infinity is 
considered, an infinity of superior cardinality necessarily exists. One need only 
construct (something that is always possible) the set of the parts  of this 
infinity. From this perspective, it becomes impossible to think a last infinity 
that no other could exceed. (Meillassoux, 2011: 229) 
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The consequences of this theorem for any cosmological conception of the world are 
staggering. As soon as we posit the existence of the world as the whole, it is possible to 
construct a power-set of this world, which will be immeasurably greater than it, leaving an 
excess that cannot be incorporated into it. The same procedure can then be applied to this 
power-set and so on to infinity. There is thus no such thing as ‘the absolutely infinite 
Infinity, the infinity of all intrinsically thinkable infinities’ (Badiou, 2005a: 277. Cf. ibid.: 283-
284). The world as the whole is never all there is: there always remains an excess that 
cannot be subsumed under this totality, which is  thus forever resigned to being limited, 
partial and particular, irrespectively of how it is defined. The challenge that any possible 
universalism must necessarily face and come to terms with is quite simply the inexistence of 
the universe (cf. Brassier and Toscano, 2003: 279). 
 
This challenge is also valid and highly pertinent for the contemporary rethinking of the 
concept of the world in terms of the infinite flux of becoming, complex autopoiesis, self -
differentiation, etc. A good example of the persistence of the theme of the whole in this 
discourse is provided by William Connolly’s brilliant World of Becoming (2011), which brings 
together the philosophies of Nietzsche, Whitehead, Bergson and Deleuze, as well as recent 
trends in complexity theory and neuroscience, to argue for an ‘immanent realist’ vision of 
the world, lacking in divine transcendence yet irreducible to mechanical materialism. While 
Connolly’s conception of the world of becoming resonates with a number of themes that we 
shall address in this book, what makes it problematic from the outset is the construction of 
this world as the whole, an infinitely complex and ever-changing whole but a totality 
nonetheless: 
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[Do] you know what the world is to me? A colossus of diverse energies, 
without beginning or end, with each flowing over, through and around others, 
generating new currents and eddies. A play of waves, forces, and perceptions 
on different scales of complexity, endurance and time, with some swelling as 
others subside, with perhaps long cycles of repetition but none that simply 
repeats those preceding. And those bursts of laughter, bouts of sensual heat, 
workers’ movements, consumption habits, hurricanes, geological formations, 
climate patterns, contending gods, electrical fields, spiritual upheavals, 
civilizational times, species change and planetary rotations – they, too, 
participate in this veritable monster of energies, making a difference before 
melting down, to be drawn again into new currents, and again.  
And the monster itself? It never completes itself, always rolling out and rolling 
in, with no outside or end-times, like a Möbius strip or Möbius current, never 
simply repeating, eternally evolving, and dissipating. A monster that feeds on 
its own excretions, that knows no joy, existential resentment, weariness, or 
horror, even as it houses all these, and more. (Connolly, 2011: 176-177) 
 
For all its extreme diversity and pluralism, invoked throughout Connolly’s text (2011: 29-32, 
74-75, 83-84, 135-136), his world is manifestly one, a ‘colossus’ or a ‘monster’, which 
‘houses’ these diverse beings without being reducible to or ‘knowing’ any of them. Yet, if we 
understand this monstrous world as the whole, what does it mean for it to ‘never complete 
itself’? If the world is forever incomplete, then it could not be  the whole and the 
inconsistency could be avoided simply by perpetually deferring its completion. Nonetheless, 
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incompleteness here refers only to the lack of teleological fulfillment and the lack of telos as 
such (see ibid.: 17-21): the world as becoming never attains a final figure. Yet, this infinite 
flux does not entail the abandonment of the idea of the whole: after all, if the world has no 
‘outside’, then it must ‘house’ not only the diverse beings listed by Connolly but all beings, 
since otherwise these ‘non-housed’ beings would form its outside. The colossus of becoming 
is precisely the Badiouan ‘Other’ into which all beings are folded. Yet, as we have argued, 
this Other is inconsistent, insofar as it is always possible to recombine its elements into a set 
of all its subsets that would be infinitely greater than the original set. In other words, there 
is always a colossus even more colossal, a monster infinitely more monstrous than the one 
posited by Connolly. The world of becoming thus ends up incomplete not only in the 
temporal or teleological sense, but also in the sense of its particularity, due to the ever-
present excess that cannot be housed by this ‘monster’. Even the world of infinite flux and 
becoming, which rolls in and out of itself, is not all there is. 
 
Thus, the problem with cosmological accounts of world politics is the very notion of the 
world as cosmos. The reason why theories of world politics inevitably reach an impasse in 
their quest for the world community, society or state is that they persist in approaching 
world politics in terms of aggregation, agglomeration or totalization: the world must be the 
entire ensemble of beings or world politics means nothing or, more exactly, becomes a mere 
synonym for international relations. In short, political universalism is envisioned in terms of 
the formation of a universal set, whose best example in contemporary IR theory is 
Alexander Wendt’s world state, envisioned as a global political totality, founded on the 
Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence and the Hegelian universal recognition (Wendt, 
2003: 504-513). While Wendt posits the emergence of this totality as teleologically 
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inevitable, set-theoretical ontology renders its very figure inconsistent: whatever set we 
posit as the universal, there will always be a power-set that will exceed it, i.e. would not 
belong to this world state, thus making the latter always less that the whole. The world state 
must from the outset renounce its universality and be forced into coexistence with the 
excess of its own power-set which, ironically, also receives the name of the ‘state’ (of the 
situation) in Badiou’s ontology: as soon as there is a world state, there are in fact two, the 
‘world state’ as the whole and another state that is (infinitely) greater than it. 
 
The thesis on the inexistence of the whole permits us to reconstruct the disciplinary history 
of IR, conventionally presented as a perennial debate between realism and idealism. 
Notwithstanding their internal theoretical and methodological diversity, these two 
paradigms may be grasped as two distinct solutions to the problem of the inconsistency of 
the totalizing concept of the world. On the one hand, insofar as the world as the whole is 
never all there is, we must approach every empirical claim to world politics or a world 
community as a hegemonic gesture of universalization that can never attain the universality 
that it attests to but is always haunted by the excess that cannot be subsumed under the 
whole and must be eradicated in acts of symbolic or physical violence. In other words, 
behind every invocation of world politics we find the reality of hegemony, domination and 
subjugation. This suspicion of universalism and the designs for world unity is constitutive of 
various forms of political realism, from Carl Schmitt’s (1976) assault on liberal 
depoliticization to E.H. Carr’s (1981) critique of utopianism, and continues to animate the 
contemporary skeptical discourse on world politics in critical or post-structuralist 
orientations. In this manner, the inexistence of the world as the whole is held to 
demonstrate the impossibility of world politics as such, leaving us with a critical task of 
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exposing the falsity of all claims to universality and the consequent affirmation of the 
pluralistic space of the international as the only real domain of political action.  
 
On the other hand, it is possible to respond to the inconsistency of the world as the whole 
by renouncing every empirical claim to world politics in order to secure the preservation of 
its ideal, which then becomes a presupposition whose ontological status is indeterminate. 
This strategy is unsurprisingly pursued by various strands of idealist approaches. If the world 
as the whole lacks being, it can only be maintained in discourse by being idealized as beyond 
or otherwise than being. Thus, the impossibility of the totalization of being leads to the 
relocation of the totality of the world beyond being, where everything can exist, but only as 
unreal. Thus, it becomes possible to posit the world community as that in which all 
particular communities are embedded, as Bartelson does, yet the actual manifestation of 
that, which we are all embedded in, must remain foreclosed, so as not to reveal its ‘non-
whole’ status: as soon as the world community is no longer the background, in which we are 
embedded, but comes to the foreground as the political subject, it will necessarily reveal its 
own particular and hegemonic status.  
 
In this manner, the notion of world politics ends up diffracted into idealist and realist 
positions that derive incommensurable conclusions from the inconsistency of the whole, 
resigning IR theory to a never-ending debate that could never be resolved, since neither of 
the sides is actually incorrect. While idealism makes of the world as the whole an ontological 
presupposition that may never attain a phenomenal status, realism moves from unraveling 
every phenomenal invocation of world politics as a simulacrum to the assertion of its 
ontological non-being. Whereas idealism makes of the world an inapparent being (a spirit), 
45 
 
realism transforms it into an existence without being (a phantom). Either way, world politics 
appears lacking either ontologically or ontically, which does not preclude a discourse about 
it but rather makes this discourse plethoric and interminable, just as the non-being of the 
unicorn does not prevent its frequent appearance in artistic, literary, medical, mythical or 
heraldic discourses. Thus, as long as we are committed to the concept of the world as the 
whole, the discourse on world politics, either in the mode of realist unmasking or idealist 
valorization, remains a discourse on something that does not exist. 
 
The World as Something 
 
Having demonstrated that the world cannot be consistently posited as the whole, let us now 
consider an alternative possibility. Accepting the argument of political realism that every 
universal set is merely the effect of the hegemonic universalization of the particular, we 
may drop universality as the criterion of the definition of the world and define the world as 
a limited totality with no pretense to universality, a something rather than everything.  
 
Indeed, such a non-cosmological, ‘local’ concept of the world was dominant in the 20th 
century phenomenology, particularly the early work of Martin Heidegger. In the first 
Division of Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962: 92-93) Heidegger begins his analysis of being-
in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein with the outline of four possible concepts of the 
world. The first concept is ontic and refers to the totality of beings objectively present-at-
hand. The second concept is ontological and refers to the being of these entities, 
interpreted as the Nature of ‘things in general’. Thirdly, the world is understood in another 
ontic sense as the world of Dasein, ‘that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to 
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‘live’’, be it a public or a private or even domestic world (ibid.: 92). Finally, the world may be 
grasped ontologically and existentially in terms of ‘worldhood in general’. Heidegger 
dismisses the first two ‘objective’ concepts as derivative and epiphenomenal, and focuses 
his inquiry on the second couple, the ontic world of Dasein and its ontologico-existential 
worldhood. The world is thus approached as that ‘wherein’ Dasein lives, the environment in 
which it encounters other beings not as objectively present-at-hand but as ‘ready-to-hand’ 
(zuhanden) for one’s dealings in the world.  
 
Heidegger proceeds to elaborate this concept of the world in terms of a referential totality 
of Dasein’s ‘involvements’ with other beings, where Dasein is absorbed in all kinds of 
assignments that involve various kinds of ‘equipment’ (Heidegger, 1962: 95-107). In its 
world, Dasein encounters other beings, which are disclosed to it in terms of practical 
functions that can be assigned to them and for which they are available. The paradigm of 
Heidegger’s world is thus the workshop, characterized by a ‘circumspective absorption in 
references and assignments constitutive for the readiness -to-hand of a totality of 
equipment’ (Ibid.: 107. Cf. Harman, 2002: 15-48; Malpas, 2006: 182-189). Thus, the world is 
always already there for Dasein as the referential totality of its involvements  and the 
discovery of any concrete entity in the world is only possible on the basis of our pre-
understanding of the world, in which we always already find ourselves. Similarly, before the 
world can be ‘known’ ontically in terms of the beings within it and ontologically in terms of 
the being of those beings, Dasein must first understand, however tentatively and 
indefinitely, its factical being-in-the-world as its basic or essential state, which grounds any 
possible knowledge of the world’s beings as present-at-hand (ibid.: 106). In this act of 
understanding is disclosed the structure of relations that define assignments and 
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involvements of Dasein’s practical activity, which Heidegger terms the significance of the 
world (ibid.: 120).  
 
The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding, which assigns or refers itself, is that 
for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to 
involvements, and this wherein is the phenomenon of the world. And the 
structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the 
worldhood of the world. (Ibid.: 119. Emphasis omitted.) 
 
Thus, Heidegger’s concept of the world in Being and Time is that of a limited relational 
totality, an ordered environment in which Dasein orients itself, sets itself tasks and acts on 
them. To this ontic concept of the world corresponds the ontological concept of worldhood 
‘as such’, defined as the relational structure of significance, within which Dasein always 
already finds itself.  
 
Alain Badiou’s phenomenology, presented in his Logics of Worlds (Badiou 2009b) offers a 
similar concept of the world as a limited totality. Nonetheless, in contrast to Heidegger 
(1962: 121), for whom the world is necessarily disclosed to Dasein and to Dasein alone, 
Badiou’s phenomenology is avowedly ‘objective’, neutralizing any intentional or ‘lived’ 
dimension of the worlds he analyzes, making the existence of worlds entirely independent 
from human existence (Badiou, 2009a: 38-39, 118-119). This accounts for a different 
relationship between ontology and phenomenology in Badiou’s work. For Heidegger 
ontology was itself necessarily phenomenological in its method, since its condition of 
possibility was Dasein’s pre-understanding of being, on whose basis the meaning of being is 
48 
 
to be interpreted (Heidegger, 1962: 29-35, 49-63). In contrast, Badiou posits a rigorous 
disjunction between ontology and phenomenology while making both entirely independent 
of the existential analytic of Dasein, which is of little interest to him (Badiou, 2009b: 118). 
While ontology deals with being in the set-theoretical sense of pure or inconsistent 
multiplicity, the phenomenology of Logics of Worlds focuses on the localization of being as 
‘being-there’, appearance in a determinate and ordered situation. It is this situation, 
structured as a network of identities and differences, that Badiou terms the world.  
 
In more technical terms, the world is defined as a set that contains a transcendental and the 
transcendental indexing of all its elements (ibid.: 598). The transcendental refers to the 
order-structure that assigns the beings of the world various degrees of intensity of 
appearance. Contrary to the more familiar concept of the transcendental in Kant’s 
philosophy, Badiou’s transcendental organization of the world is a strictly immanent and 
objective process that accounts for the logical cohesion of appearance, which is not 
determined by the ontological composition of the situation – a key point we shall return to 
below (ibid.: 101, 121-122, 241-242). For this reason, there may be as many transcendentals 
as there are worlds. As an order-structure, the transcendental is a subset of the situation 
that performs logical operations of assigning the minimum of appearance in the world, the 
possibility of conjoining the degrees of appearance of any two values and the possibility of 
synthesizing the values of appearance of any number of elements in an ‘envelope’ (ibid.: 
102-103, 159-165). These operations permit to assign identity-functions to the beings that 
appear in the world or ‘index’ them on the transcendental. Transcendental indexing is a 
function that makes a transcendental degree of appearance (from the minimum to the 
maximum) correspond to a pair of elements of the set that appears in the world. For 
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instance, if the identity-function of two elements a and b is the maximum, this means that 
they appear in the world in question to the same degree. On the basis of these operations 
Badiou builds up an elaborate phenomenology, in which any situation whatsoever, from a 
protest demonstration to a country house on an autumn evening, can be analyzed as a 
world, structured by a particular transcendental order.  
 
It is crucial to emphasize that Badiou’s notion of phenomenology is entirely distinct from, if 
not diametrically opposite to, the phenomenological tradition of the 20th century in its 
various versions. As an objective phenomenology, the description of worlds must neutralize 
not their ‘real existence’ but precisely the intentional or lived dimension that, from Husserl 
onwards, has been the focus of the phenomenological method. ‘In doing so, we grasp the 
equivalence between appearing and logic through a pure description, a description without 
a subject.’ (Ibid.: 38) While this understanding of phenomenology at first glance appears 
scandalous from any conventional perspective, it is at the very least legitimate by the classic 
definition of phenomenology developed by Heidegger (1962: 49-62; 1988: 15-22): the 
apophantic disclosure of phenomena in the logos, ‘letting that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way that it shows itself from itself’ (Heidegger, 1962: 58). Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology and Badiou’s objective phenomenology both disclose 
phenomena, i.e. beings that appear in worlds. What divides them is only the logos that they 
rely on in this disclosure, i.e. the hermeneutic discourse of the existential analytic of Dasein 
for Heidegger and the logical discourse of category and topos theory for Badiou. While it is 
certainly possible to debate which mode of logos is better at its apophantic task, wha t is 
important for our purposes is simply to establish the possibility of an objective 
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phenomenology of worlds which has dispensed with the transcendental subject in favour of 
the idea of the transcendental as the immanent organization of the world. 
 
Badiou’s conception of the world yields two important consequences. Firstly, on the basis of 
the principle of the inexistence of the whole, we may conclude that there is always more 
than one world (Badiou 2009b: 114-115). Moreover, the number of worlds can only be 
infinite: if there were a finite number of worlds, they could easily be agglomerated into the 
whole. Secondly, every one of these worlds is itself infinite. It is impossible to delimit a 
world either from below through the dissemination of its elements  or from above through 
their totalization (ibid.: 306-310, 331-335). In the first case, the result of the dissemination 
of the elements of the world into ever-smaller elements would still be a component of the 
world in question: the world does not have anything ‘beneath’ it in the sense of a primal 
matter that escapes appearance.  ‘If you disseminate an ontological component of a world 
by examining the elements of its elements, the result of this dissemination is still a 
component of the same world.’ (ibid.: 307) In the second case, the totalization of all the 
possible subsets of the world into its power-set remains an entity of the same world. Since 
according to the theorem of the point of excess this power-set will be more numerous than 
the original set,2 it is impossible to prescribe a maximal number of elements in the world, 
which logically forbids the finitude of the world (ibid.: 309). ‘[Cantor] secularized the infinite 
by means of a literalization whose boldness – an unheard-of transfixion of the religious veil 
of meaning – orients us within a thinking still to come that can be encapsulated in a single 
phrase: insofar as a number is its real, every situation is essentially infinite.’ (Badiou 2008a: 
225)3  
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Thus, we have moved from the assumption of one world as the Whole to the infinity of 
particular worlds that are themselves infinite. It is thus possible to analyze any situation 
whatsoever as a world, endowed with a particular transcendental. Instead of Connolly’s 
image of one ‘monstrous’ world of infinite flux and complexity, we end up with an image of 
an infinity of infinite worlds, which nonetheless need not be a priori posited as extremely 
complex or in perpetual flux. A world of presidential elections in a given country is certainly 
infinite, yet its transcendental order is relatively simple and stable, there being nothing 
particularly monstrous about it, aside, perhaps, from individual candidates. As soon as we 
abandon the identification of the world with the whole, Connolly’s dramatization of flux  and 
becoming loses its urgency: evidently, some worlds are more complex and dynamic than 
others. Of course, this does not mean that these worlds all exist in isolation from each 
other. For example, the world of a protest demonstration or a refugee camp possesses a 
specific transcendental order and may be analyzed as a world in its own right but also 
belongs to the wider worlds of e.g. municipal elections or immigration policy, which in turn 
both belong to a still wider world of regional politics and so on. Every world may belong to 
other worlds – the only world that it cannot belong to is the whole, which does not exist. 
Moreover, every world must belong to some other world, since the only thing that does not 
belong to anything else must be the whole, to which everything in turn would belong 
(Badiou, 2005: 45; 2009b: 112). Every world is a world of worlds but there is no such thing as 
the world of all worlds. 
 
 [The] unity of a world is nothing other than its diversity, and its diversity is, in 
turn, a diversity of worlds. A world is a multiplicity of worlds and its unity is the 
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sharing out and the mutual exposure in this world of all its worlds. (Nancy, 
2007: 109) 
 
This particularistic concept of the world can be fruitfully applied in political science and IR in 
the study of such limited totalities as the ‘worlds’ of local elections, G8 summits, 
universities, global trade, development aid, border policing or refugee camps. Each of those 
worlds is characterized by a specific transcendental order that can be reconstituted through 
a Heideggerian, Badiouan or other phenomenology but is at the same time part of a wider 
world and decomposable into smaller worlds that are also liable to phenomenological 
analysis. The politics of these worlds would then be derived from the transcendental , by 
which the world in question is governed. The study of politics in different worlds may then 
take the form of a Foucauldian ‘analytics of government’, the immanent reconstitution of 
positive dispositifs of governmental rationalities in such distinct worlds as diplomacy, 
humanitarian aid, counter-intelligence, which may overlap with, feed into or remain 
separate from one another, but never constitute anything like the whole (Foucault, 1991, 
2008, 2009; Dean, 1999; Larner and Walters, 2004; Walters, 2006; Li, 2007; de Larrinaga and 
Doucet, 2010; Parker, 2012).4 
 
Yet, this understanding of the world and its politics cannot but be disappointing for any 
attempt to rethink world politics in its more familiar universalist sense, since ‘world politics’ 
here would simply mean a politics that unfolds within a particular world and what counts for 
politics in different worlds need not be the same thing. The very question of political 
universality appears to be foreclosed by the plurality of worlds with particular orders above 
or between which no authority exists. There is only an infinity of particular worlds with 
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particular regimes of politics – an image that immediately brings to mind the pluralistic 
realm of the international. Is not world politics then strictly synonymous to international 
relations and the world simply identical to the international domain that it was intended to 
transcend? (Walker, 2009: 21-22) This is indeed the position of the diverse group of the 
critics of cosmopolitan universalism who affirm the pluralism of the international as the sole 
possible universal (see e.g. Jackson, 2003; Connolly, 1995; Mouffe, 2009), whereby the 
world is nothing but a plurality of worlds and world politics consists in maintaining this 
plurality against any hegemonic totalization.  
 
Nonetheless, the universalization of the international as the ‘world of all worlds’ merely 
throws us back into logical inconsistency. Since, as we have seen, the domain of the 
international cannot be the whole, it must be a particular world among others. The 
international does not lose any of this particularity by virtue of being a huge world that 
envelops the entire planet, especially as it does so in a specific and selective manner, 
including some entities while excluding others (non-state communities, postcolonial 
populations, global social movements, the environment, etc). We do not even need 
recourse to set-theoretical reasoning to demonstrate that the international is not the whole, 
since empirical examples of exclusion from this realm abound. Nonetheless, the focus on 
these empirical examples may ultimately be misleading, since it would orient the critical 
discourse on world politics towards advocating a politics of inclusion as the pathway from 
particularistic international politics to a genuine world politics. Yet, it is precisely this desire 
to include everything that leads us back to the inconsistent figure of the universal set and 
the problem of the hegemonic universalization of the particular: even if we were to concede 
the utterly utopian possibility of the transformation of the international that would 
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overcome every exclusion, what this whole could never include is the excess of the set of its 
parts over its original elements.  
 
While the idea of this excessive ‘power-set’ might appear too abstract, it is in fact of 
supreme relevance for the problem of the world. In Badiou’s ontology the operation of 
inclusion (grouping into subsets) is constitutive of what he terms the state of the situation, 
its ‘metastructure’ that re-presents its elements by, literally, counting them once more as 
parts (2005a: 81-111). Badiou’s use of the term ‘state’ to designate this operation 
accentuates its analogy with the political order, which is maintained by ordering the pure 
multiplicity of elements into distinct groups characterized by particular identities.  Indeed, 
the simplest way to grasp the operation of the meta-structure is to conceive of it as the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which is not concerned with individuals per se as pure 
elements but only as representatives of groups, be they grouped by class, gender, race, 
professional occupation, sexual preference or what not. ‘This [statist] coercion consists in 
not being held to be someone who belongs to society but as someone who is included 
within society. The State is fundamentally indifferent to belonging yet it is constantly 
concerned with inclusion.’ (Badiou, 2005a: 107-108) Thus, while the originary structure of 
the situation is constituted by the pure belonging of its individual and disconnected 
elements, the state of the situation is constituted by ordering the possible combinations 
between these elements: ‘The State is not founded upon the social bond, which it would 
express, but rather upon un-binding which it prohibits.’ (Ibid.: 109)  
 
And yet, although the operation of metastructural representation is meant to protect the 
situation from its unbinding, it actually threatens this very unbinding by introducing into the 
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situation the excess of parts over elements. According to the theorem of the point of excess, 
there always exists at least one ‘excrescent’ element of the power-set that does not belong 
to the original set. It is easy to see that one such excrescent element is the state of the 
situation itself, which did not belong to the original situation, just as the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state is structurally separate from the society and ‘represents’ nothing 
within it. Thus, in the case of the hypothetical universalization of the international there 
would be at least one element that would escape this universalization, while at the same 
time making it possible, i.e. the world state itself as a meta-structure of representation, 
which by definition exceeds the whole that it brings into being. Yet, we must also recall that 
with respect to worlds as infinite sets the Cohen-Easton theorem establishes that the excess 
of the power-set is strictly immeasurable and errant, capable of taking any (infinite) value. 
Thus, the universalization of the international into a hypothetical whole would not merely 
result in the paradoxical exteriority of the resultant world state to the totality that 
comprises it but in the literally limitless proliferation of excessive recombinations of 
elements that immeasurably exceed their originally infinite number. The inclusive politics of 
the universalization of the international opens up Pandora’s box, out of which come all 
kinds of monstrous combinations that cannot be subsumed under the inclusive order and 
mock its every claim to universality. 
 
Thus, not only is the international not identical to the universal; as a particular world it is 
also not universalizable. The idea of the international as an actual or potential world of all 
worlds arises out of an illusory identification of totality and infinity. Since every world is a 
world of worlds, the international world may of course contain an infinite multiplicity of 
worlds, but the only thing that this or any other world cannot contain is everything. For this 
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reason, the ethico-political drive for the greater inclusiveness of the international, advanced 
in various ways by feminist, postcolonial or poststructuralist theories, may certainly make 
the international a ‘better place’ but will not attain world politics. As Walker demonstrates 
admirably, one will never reach the universality of the world if one begins from the 
international (Walker, 2009: 26-31). There is no passage from any particular world, however 
diverse and inclusive, towards universality. Yet, while this claim leads Walker to a profound 
skepticism about world politics as such, the impossibility of passing from the international to 
the world is only a problem as long as we continue to envision the universality of world 
politics as necessarily mediated by particularity. If the world of the international is a 
particular world among others and, as Walker argues at length, its particular transcendental 
is historically contingent, the impossibility of arriving at the universality of world politics 
from the particularism of the international simply entails the need for another starting point 
for conceptualizing the universality of world politics. Since presupposing the world as the 
whole leads us to inconsistency and starting from particular worlds leads us nowhere, this 
new starting point is obtained by abandoning every totalizing conception of the world and 
asserting its universality without recourse to any mediation by the particular. It is this 
solution that we address in the following section.  
 
The World as Nothing 
 
While at first glance the particularistic conception of worlds merely confirms the impasse of 
the discourse of world politics due to the inaccessibility of the universal, it actually guides us 
towards a solution to our problem by raising the question of the conditions of the 
appearance of this infinity of worlds. Simply put, where are all these worlds? Just as we 
57 
 
commonly speak of all the birds, books, athletes or mountains in the world, we may speak 
of the infinity of worlds as existing ‘in the world’. But what is this world in which the infinity 
of positive, transcendentally regulated worlds comes to appearance? If this ‘world of all 
worlds’ were itself a positive world, it would have to be a self-belonging universal set, which 
we have dismissed as logically inconsistent. And yet, it is barely possible to give up on the 
existence of such a world.  
 
The problem is well illustrated by the ambiguity of Badiou’s own political maxim that 
prescribes resistance to all forms of exclusion, inequality and domination: ‘There is only one 
world!’ (Badiou, 2008b: 53-70). Since this statement so patently contradicts the claims in 
the Logics of Worlds about the infinity of worlds, misunderstandings may easily arise. Might 
Badiou mean that among the infinite number of worlds there is something like a ‘political 
world’, which is indeed ‘one’? This solution would evidently contradict Badiou’s preference 
for describing highly circumscribed and concrete worlds, including political ones, e.g. the 
world of a protest demonstration (Badiou, 2009b: 199-216), of a battle (ibid.: 277-288) or of 
revolutionary struggle (ibid.: 493-503). Of course, since every world is a world of worlds, it 
might be possible to isolate something like a world of ‘politics as such’ that would envelop 
the more specific worlds above, yet the result would be a trivial agglomeration whose 
advantages remain elusive. Thus, Badiou’s ‘one world’ cannot refer to any positive world, 
however general and loosely structured, but only to that in which an infinity of worlds 
comes to appear. Yet, what could this ‘in which’ possibly be? 
 
From ancient Greek atomism onwards, this problem has been resolved by asserting that 
whatever exists positively does so in the empty space, vacuum or void, in short – Nothing 
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(see Gregory, 1981; Badiou, 2009c: 56-64). Indeed, this answer appears to be the last 
remaining logical possibility: if we have excluded the possibility of the world being 
everything and we are not satisfied with a particularistic understanding of the world as 
something, then the world can only be nothing. Yet, everything depends on how we 
understand this ‘nothing’. As we shall argue in more detail in Chapter 2, as long as it is 
understood in the merely negative sense of privation, lack or absence, we remain within the 
political ontology of the international, for which there are only particular worlds and 
nothing beyond them. Bartelson invokes this negative sense of the void in his criticism of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism, which lacks a positive vision of world community and only 
exhibits an ‘ontological void’ (Bartelson, 2009: 28). However, it is also possible to 
understand the claim about the nothingness of the world as a pure affirmation: there is a 
world, in which an infinity of infinite worlds appears, and this World, which we shall 
henceforth capitalize to distinguish it from worlds as limited particularistic totalities, is 
nothing but the void.  
 
Let us elucidate this concept of the World by revisiting Heidegger’s work after Being and 
Time, in which there is a gradual shift away from the understanding of the world as a 
practical context of Dasein’s activity towards an ontological concept of the world as the 
clearing of being (cf. Malpas, 2006: 186-189). In his 1929-1930 course of lectures The 
Fundamental Concepts on Metaphysics Heidegger defines the world as the ‘manifestness of 
beings as such as a whole’ (Heidegger, 1995: 284). What is at stake in this definition is not 
the whole of beings (the impossible universal set) but rather the disclosure of beings as 
beings (ibid.: 274-275, 279-280). The phenomenology of particular worlds in Being and Time 
as well as the analysis of the concept of the world in the history of philosophy in On the 
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Essence of Ground (Heidegger, 1998: 97-134) are now reinscribed within a wider and more 
ambitious inquiry into the sense of the world that proceeds through the comparison 
between humanity and animality, between the ‘world-forming’ (weltbildend) character of 
Dasein and the ‘poor in the world’ (weltarm) status of the animal.  
 
While ‘world-formation’ belongs to the essence of Dasein, in its everyday practices human 
beings inevitably fail to distinguish the world from the beings within it. For Heidegger, 
‘[ordinary] understanding cannot see the world for beings. In relation to the individual trees 
and the way they are gathered together the forest is something else. It is that out of which 
the many trees belong to a forest.’ (Heidegger, 1995: 347) The World is thus neither a being 
nor an aggregation of all beings but rather the opening or ‘projection’ (ibid.: 362), in which 
beings (and positive worlds as ordered realms of beings) become disclosed in the first place.  
In the occurrence of projection world is formed, i.e. in projecting something erupts and 
irrupts towards possibilities, thereby irrupting into what is actual as such, so as to 
experience itself as having irrupted as an actual being in the midst of what can now be 
manifest as beings. It is a being of a properly primordial kind, which has irrupted to that way 
of being that we call Dasein, and to that being which we say exists, i.e. ex-sists, is an exiting 
from itself in the essence of its being, yet without abandoning itself. (ibid.: 365) 
 
Thus, the world is formed as an opening, which tears Dasein away from its actual 
preoccupations and throws it into the potentiality of existence, whereby the being of the 
beings around Dasein may be disclosed for the first time. Particular worlds of the kind 
analyzed in Being and Time, which provide a practical context of Dasein’s everyday activity, 
are thus conditioned by the prior opening of the World, which tears Dasein away from its 
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absorption in everydayness. This argument recalls Heidegger’s earlier claim in Being and 
Time about the withdrawal of the being of entities that are ready-to-hand (zuhanden) from 
our access: these beings that Heidegger unites under the rubric of ‘equipment’, determined 
by their references and assignments, only become accessible as ‘present-at-hand’ 
(vorhanden) when they break down, are lost, missing or standing in the way of our concerns 
(Heidegger, 1962: 102-107). It is precisely in this breakdown in the referential contexts that 
define a particular world that this world is ‘lit up’ or ‘announces itself’  as such (ibid.: 105). 
 
This ‘announcement of the world’ is in the later works presented not merely as a result of 
conspicuous, obtrusive and obstinate presence of broken tools but as an effect of a 
‘fundamental attunement’ or mood (Stimmung), which in Being and Time has been 
addressed in terms of anxiety (1962: 228-234). In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
this world-disclosing mood is described as profound boredom and is addressed in the first 
two hundred pages of the text, preceding the more specific engagement with the question 
of the world. In his phenomenology of boredom Heidegger moves progressively from the 
most familiar form of boredom as being-bored-by-something (a determinate object or 
situation) through the more general being-bored-with-something that arises from within 
Dasein and has no determinate object to the most ‘profound’ boredom, which is precisely 
the attunement through which the world is disclosed (Heidegger, 1995: 82-88, 113-125, 
136-143). This profound form of boredom is characterized by the intensification of the two 
‘structural moments’ that define boredom as such: being left empty and being held in limbo.  
The first moment refers to Dasein’s ‘being delivered to beings’ telling refusal of themselves 
as a whole’ (ibid.: 137), whereby it finds itself in a state of indifference that envelops all 
beings, including Dasein itself. In this state beings around us evidently do not disappear but 
61 
 
rather manifest themselves as such precisely in their indifference. The things we do in order 
to pass the time when bored, the diversions with which we try to entertain or amuse 
ourselves, fail to engage us, leaving us suspended in the withdrawal of beings. The second 
moment, being held in limbo, is closely related to this suspension. The beings that refuse 
themselves are nothing other than possibilities of Dasein’s existence that are left 
unexploited (ibid.: 141). What refuses itself to Dasein are the things it could have done, 
experienced or used, which now stand before it as wholly inaccessible. However, this 
withdrawal of concrete or specific possibilities impels Dasein towards a more extreme and 
originary possibility, the originary ‘making possible’ (ibid.: 143-144). In other words, the 
suspension of particular possibilities reveals what makes these possibilities possible in the 
first place and thus makes Dasein itself possible as the being whose essence is contained in 
its potentiality for being. Dasein is simultaneously entranced by the emptiness of the beings’ 
total indifference and impelled towards what Heidegger calls the ‘moment of vision’ (ibid.: 
151-152, cf. Heidegger, 1962: 371-380), a resolute grasp of the authentic possibility of 
existence. It is thus the combination of the disclosure of the expanse of beings that refuse 
themselves and the experience of the extreme possibility of Dasein itself that constitutes 
the fundamental attunement, in which the world formation takes place.  
 
Yet, what exactly is revealed in this disclosure? As Giorgio Agamben (2004: 39-74) has 
argued in an incisive critique of this lecture course, Heidegger’s description of the world-
disclosing attunement of Dasein is uncannily close to the phenomenology of animal life that 
Heidegger terms ‘poor-in-world’ (weltarm). In Heidegger’s analysis, the animal is defined by 
captivation, its incapacity to suspend or deactivate its relation with its ‘disinhibiting ring’, i.e. 
its immediate environment that is never disclosed to the animal as such (Heidegger, 1995: 
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240-253). This condition of being delivered over to something that refuses itself is exactly 
the same as the first structural moment of ‘being left empty’. ‘In becoming bored, Dasein is 
delivered over to something that refuses itself, exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is 
exposed in something unrevealed.’ (Agamben, 2004: 65) The sole difference between 
humanity and animality pertains to the second structural moment. While both animal and 
man can be left empty by beings that refuse themselves, no animal can ever be held in 
limbo. ‘What the animal is unable to do is suspend and deactivate its relationship with the 
ring of its specific disinhibitors. The animal environment is constituted in such a way that 
something like a pure possibility can never become manifest within it.’ (Agamben, 2004: 68) 
In contrast, Dasein finds in this very manifestation the moment of its authentic existence as 
‘world-forming’: ‘of all beings only the human being, called upon by the voice of being, 
experiences the wonder of all wonders: that beings are.’ (Heidegger, 1998: 234) 
 
It is this difference which leads Agamben to a striking conclusion that remains only implicit 
in Heidegger’s text, since it runs contrary to the privilege his thought grants to Dasein. The 
passage from the world-poor animal to the world-forming man ‘does not open onto a 
further, wider and brighter space, achieved beyond the limits of the animal environment 
and unrelated to it; on the contrary, it is opened only by means of a suspension and a 
deactivation of the animal relation with the disinhibitor.’ (Agamben, 2004: 68) Just as the 
‘voice of being’ is essentially silent (Heidegger, 1998: 236), ‘the jewel set at the centre of the 
human world and its Lichtung (clearing) is nothing but animal captivation.’ (Agamben, 2004: 
68) The opening of the World that is disclosed to Dasein does not mark a liberation from 
captivation but a deliverance to captivation: ‘whoever looks in the open sees only a closing, 
only a not-seeing.’ (Ibid. See also Heidegger, 1977: 169-180) If the animal is open to a 
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closedness that it could never access ‘as such’, the human being is able to do precisely that 
when it suspends its relation with the beings of the world - it is able to grasp the 
inaccessible as inaccessible: ‘Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored. 
This awakening of the living being to its own being-captivated, this anxious and resolute 
opening to a not-open, is the human.’ (Ibid.: 70) Yet, this opening obviously does not 
amount to much or, in fact, to anything at all. The opening of the World as a result of the 
subtraction of the human being from its particular world in the mood of boredom opens 
Dasein to nothingness pure and simple: 
 
From the beginning, being is traversed by the nothing: the Lichtung is also 
originarily Nichtung, because the world has become open for man only 
through the interruption and nihilation of the living being’s relationship with 
its disinhibitor. Being appears in the ‘clear night of the nothing’ only because 
man, in the experience of profound boredom, has risked himself in the 
suspension of his relationship with his environment as a living being. (Ibid.: 70)  
 
In this manner, Heidegger’s explorations of the relation between humanity and animality in 
the 1929-1930 course connect with his theorization of the metaphysical problem of the 
nothing in the lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’, delivered during the same year.5 In this 
lecture, Dasein is explicitly defined as ‘being held out into the nothing’ (Heidegger, 1977: 
108) and this nothing is posited as the paradoxical ‘ground’, in which all beings come to 
appear:  Ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit [from the nothing all beings as beings come to be] 
(ibid.). While traditionally metaphysics tended to approach the nothing as the ‘counter-
concept of being’, its pure and simple opposite, Heidegger demonstrates the way, in which 
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nothing, which is indeed not a being, nonetheless discloses the being of beings as such: ‘For 
human existence, the nothing makes possible the openedness of beings as such. The 
nothing does not merely serve as the counter-concept of beings; rather, it originally belongs 
to their essential unfolding as such. In the Being of beings the nihilation of the nothing 
occurs.’ (Ibid.: 104) The nothing discloses the difference of all beings with respect to itself: 
‘[The nothing] discloses these beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as 
what is radically other – with respect to the nothing. In the clear night of the nothing of 
anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings – and not 
nothing. Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence 
approach and penetrate beings.’ (Ibid.: 103. Cf. Harman, 2002: 90-95) The nothing is not a 
being, yet it nonetheless ‘prevails as being’, which ‘gives every being the warrant to be’ 
(Heidegger, 1998: 233). 
 
As that which is altogether other than all beings, being is that which is not. But 
this nothing essentially prevails as being. We too quickly abdicate thinking 
when, in a facile explanation, we pass off the nothing as a mere nullity and 
equate it with the unreal. [Instead], we must experience in the nothing the 
pervasive expanse of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is 
being itself. Without being, whose abyssal but yet to be unfolded essence 
dispenses the nothing to us in essential anxiety, all beings would remain in an 
absence of being. (Ibid.: 233) 
 
In its everyday comportment Dasein usually loses itself among the beings ‘ready-to-hand’ in 
its particular world, much as the animal that is captivated inside its disinhibiting ring (see 
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Heidegger, 1962: 203-224). For the inhabitant of a particular world, there are only the 
beings of this world and ‘beyond them there is nothing’, in the negative sense of mere 
absence (Heidegger, 1977: 85). Yet, in contrast to the animal, Dasein is capable of rising 
above the ‘superficies of existence’ in a fundamental attunement such as boredom in the 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics or anxiety in Being and Time and What is 
Metaphysics? (ibid.: 104). However, this ‘rise above’ does not take us to another place, 
characterized by the rich diversity of beings and the plenitude of possibilities, but, on the 
contrary, entails our subtraction from all these beings and possibilities in our ‘world’, 
inhabiting our world as nothing, so that Dasein stands alone in the clearing of being as the 
‘lieutenant of the Nothing’ (ibid.: 106). 
 
This theme of the world as void culminates in Heidegger’s 1947 Letter on Humanism, in 
which he reinterprets the human as a ‘worldly’ being. Against the contrast between 
‘worldly’ and ‘spiritual’ in everyday language, Heidegger understands Dasein’s worldliness in 
terms of its transcendence of any particular being or realm of being (i.e. a positive world) 
through being ‘placed freely into the clearing of Being, which alone is ‘world’’: 
 
[For] us ‘world’ does not at all signify beings or any realm of beings but the 
openness of Being. Man stands out into the openness of Being. ‘World’ is the 
clearing of Being into which man stands out on the basis of his thrown 
essence. World is in a certain sense precisely ‘the beyond’ within existence and 
for it. (ibid.: 252) 
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Thus, Heidegger’s conception of the world moves from the phenomenology of particular 
worlds as immanent practical contexts of Dasein’s activity to the affirmation of the World as 
the void or clearing, in which such worlds are disclosed to Dasein. It is important to 
emphasize that since the World as void is not a being, to posit the World as a clearing 
‘beyond’ existence is not to engage in a quasi-theological move of positing a Supreme Being 
that transcends this world. The World does not designate a being, supreme or otherwise, 
but solely the opening, in which an infinity of infinite worlds may appear. The void is 
therefore the condition of possibility of any positive world whatsoever: it is that in which 
these worlds appear, but, in contrast to the two concepts of the world addressed above, it 
neither totalizes these worlds into the whole nor is mediated by them. Nonetheless, while 
avoiding the problems of these two concepts, the Heideggerian concept of the World raises 
other questions, particularly concerning the relation between the World as void and the 
positive worlds of the kind addressed in the previous section, e.g. the worlds of factory 
production, diplomacy, elections, development, migration or war. If these worlds simply 
come to appearance against the background of the void as ‘not nothing’, the World appears 
to be little more than a logical condition that can hardly ground any politics, reduced as it is 
to a neutral support of the infinite proliferation of positive worlds coexisting in the vacuum. 
In this manner, in an ironic reversal of Heidegger’s own intention, politics would be 
‘deontologized’ and reduced to the positive principles governing autonomous worlds, 
between which no adjudication is possible, since what is beyond these positivities is purely 
and simply nothing (cf. Mandarini, 2009). Instead of universalism, we would end up with 
nihilism and relativism once again. In order to recover the universalist potential of the 
concept of the World as void we must elaborate its relation to the worlds it discloses. In 
other words, we must reassert the difference between the phenomenology of worlds and 
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the ontology of the World in order to specify the way the latter affects the former. In the 
following section we shall pursue this question in an analysis of Alain Badiou’s ontology of 
the void. 
  
The Universality of the Void 
 
While Badiou restricts the term ‘world’ to the positive totalities regulated by a 
transcendental order, the void is the most important concept in his ontology and functions 
in the manner resonant with Heidegger’s clearing , yet also radicalizing his ontological 
insight. Ironically, while in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger famously accused mathematics 
and other exact sciences of being incapable of treating the nothing (Heidegger, 1977: 94-
95), Badiou’s use of the set-theoretical category of the void set to ground ontology 
demonstrates precisely the kind of engagement with the nothing that Heidegger sought.  
 
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou departs from the void as the first determinable set. Since in a 
set-theoretical ontology one can only posit a set if one can determine its composition, it is 
possible to immediately determine a set that has no elements, i.e. the void set Ø. The 
thinkability of all other sets depends on their belonging to specific worlds. Yet, since the 
void set has no elements, it logically appears in any world whatsoever: 
 
Since the void is the only immediate being, it follows that it figures in any 
world whatsoever. In its absence, no operation can have a starting point in 
being, that is to say, no operation can operate. Without the void, there is no 
world, if by ‘world’ we understand the closed place of an operation. 
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Conversely, where something operates – that is, where there is world – the 
void can be attested. (Badiou, 2009b: 114.) 
 
While for Heidegger every particular world must be disclosed in the void, for Badiou it is  the 
void itself that appears in every positive world. Moreover, in contrast to Heidegger, for 
Badiou the void is not merely the clearing of being but literally its building block, so that 
whatever appears in the world ultimately depends on the void for its being. To recall, what 
appears in Heidegger’s clearing, i.e. beings and worlds as ‘realms of beings’, is not itself 
composed of the clearing but is disclosed against the background of the Nothing as precisely 
not nothing. The genitive in the phrase ‘clearing of being’ is both subjective and objective: 
the clearing both belongs to being (it is being’s own clearing) and what being itself is (it is 
being that is cleared), which is why Heidegger’s ultimate answer to the question of what 
being is is ‘nothing’ (1998: 233). However, it does not follow from this that beings are also 
nothing, but rather that being as nothing ‘distinguishes itself from all beings’ (ibid.). In 
contrast, for Badiou beings are indeed ‘woven out of the void’ (Badiou, 2005a: 57. Cf. 
Badiou, 2009b: 112-113). This certainly does not mean that everything is in fact made of 
nothing, but merely that in order to be grasped in the aspect of their being, beings must be 
subtracted from all positive predicates they are endowed with in particular worlds, just like 
Dasein is in the mood of profound boredom:  
 
What ontology theorizes is the inconsistent multiple of any situation, that is, 
the multiple subtracted from any particular law, from any count-as-one, the a-
structured multiple. The proper mode in which inconsistency wanders within 
the whole of a situation is the nothing, and the mode in which it unpresents 
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itself is that of subtraction from the count, the non-one, the void. (Badiou, 
2005a: 58) 
 
Insofar as the entirety of beings in any given world is subject to a transcendental ordering 
that makes it consistent, that which remains inconsistent can only be nothing. For this 
reason, ontology is equivalent to a theory of the void and, moreover, can only be a theory of 
the void, since if it asserted the existence of other any beings, it would reduce itself to 
phenomenology, i.e. the description of the transcendental orders of particular worlds. 
Ontology must therefore begin and end with the void, all of its terms being derived from the 
void alone (Badiou, 2005a: 57). 
 
[The] absolutely primary theme of ontology is therefore the void – the Greek 
atomists, Democritus and his successors, clearly understood this – but it is also 
its final theme because in the last resort, all inconsistency is unpresentable, 
thus void. If there are ‘atoms’, they are not, as the materialists of antiquity 
believed, a second principle of being, the one after the void, but compositions 
of the void itself, ruled by the ideal laws of the multiple whose axiom system is 
laid out by ontology. Ontology, therefore, can only count the void as existent. 
(Ibid.: 58) 
 
All the beings of every world are, in their being, compositions of the void. With the help of 
the axioms of set theory, it is possible to generate an infinite number of sets from the void 
alone, starting from the Two, a coupling of the name of the void Ø and its singleton (a set 
whose only element is the void):  [Ø, {Ø}], and so on to infinity. Thus, the World as void is 
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not merely the ‘nothing’ against whose background beings emerge but rather the 
ontological condition of possibility of all the beings, which appear in all positive worlds. 
Insofar as the void figures in any world whatsoever, it is a ‘universal part’ (ibid.: 86-88), 
underlying the constitution and structuration of every particular world. It is easy to see that 
the universality of this ‘part’ satisfies the criteria of immediacy and non-totalizability that 
are necessary to avoid logical inconsistency: insofar as the World is nothing, it is the very 
opposite of the Whole, and insofar as it is the ground of all being, it is always already there, 
immediately, in any world whatsoever. Thus, the World is the universal that precedes and 
exceeds the constitution of anything particular, making possible the proliferation of the 
infinite number of worlds while proscribing their aggregation into the whole.  
 
While the World is in every world, it is important to emphasize that there is no necessary 
relation between the World as void and the positivity of worlds – it would be absurd to 
suggest that the void of being could somehow prescribe positive forms of appearance 
(Badiou, 2009b: 118). If one could infer appearance from being, there would only be one 
positive world whose transcendental order would somehow ‘correspond’ to the void – that 
world would have to be the Whole and is therefore impossible. The positivity of worlds as 
regulated structures of appearance is thus not determined by the void of the World, which 
only conditions the being of the being of these worlds. It is nonetheless possible to make 
the opposite move of inferring being from appearance that would establish ‘an ontological 
halting point’ (ibid.: 195) to the infinite proliferation of intra-worldly appearances. In 
Badiou’s postulate of materialism, ‘every atom of appearance is real’ (ibid.: 218-220), so 
that whatever appears in the world must have an ontological correlate, a multiplicity 
composed of the void. This postulate excludes the possibility that appearance in any given 
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world would be grounded in something virtual or that something that exists in the world 
would lack any being (ibid.: 219). Yet, while this postulate excludes the existence of purely 
virtual or chimerical beings, the transcendental of the world remains without any 
foundation in being and hence precisely virtual and chimerical. In Badiou’s own account 
(2011: 75), the transcendental ‘does not exist’, at least not in the same way as the beings 
that it orders. As a set of degrees of appearance, the transcendental is certainly as real as 
any other set, yet its operation on the beings of the world that endows the world with a 
positive order has no foundation in being. It is precisely this lack of being that accounts for 
the contingency of the order of every world: ontologically, no world is necessary, even if all 
that appears in it is real.  
 
Thus, we end up with the tripartite scheme, in which the abyss between an infinity of 
positive worlds and the void of the World is bridged by the set-theoretical ontology of pure 
multiplicity: the World as void of being - beings composed of the void – beings positively 
ordered in worlds. What the World makes possible is, strictly speaking, not this or that world 
in particular but rather the proliferation of being as inconsistent multiplicity, which is then 
ordered in accordance with the transcendental of a given world, which itself has no 
foundation in being. In other words, the World as void brings forth the ontological material 
for the construction of worlds that ensures that whatever appears is real without 
prescribing how it should appear. Thus, while whatever appears in the world is necessarily 
grounded in real being, the mode of its appearance is absolutely contingent, having no 
ontological correlate. There is no ontological reason why any world should be what it is and 
even why any particular world should exist at all.  
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This scheme permits us to reappraise the theme of becoming that we have addressed above 
with respect to Connolly’s (2011) concept of the world. The idea of becoming may now be 
conceived on two distinct levels. On the one hand, becoming pertains to the emergence of 
the being of worlds out of the void of the World. While the World as void does not become, 
since there is nothing in it that could possibly change, all worlds are becoming from the 
World but only in the aspect of their sheer being: the World grants worlds their being but 
not their appearance. We may term this ‘ontological becoming’ or ‘becoming-being’. 
Contrary to Connolly’s idea of becoming as monstrous autopoietic flux, this mode of 
becoming is in fact quite ordinary and even tedious, since it consists in the infinite 
proliferation of infinite sets, distinguished solely by their extensionality: [a, b], [a, b, c], [b, c, 
d] and so on. On the other hand, becoming may pertain to the process of intra-worldly 
ordering and transformation, in which beings of the world are endowed with positive 
identities. We may term this ‘phenomenological becoming’ or ‘becoming-appearance’. 
Contrary to Connolly’s exultation of becoming as an ontogenetic force, this mode of 
becoming has no relation to ontology whatsoever, since the World does not prescribe even 
that there should be this or that world, let alone what positive form it would take. Thus, 
instead of defining the world in terms of becoming, we end up with the World which does 
not become by definition and an infinity of worlds whose becoming is ontologically 
grounded in the void yet remains ontically or phenomenally contingent. 
 
Thus, the World and particular worlds remain disjointed and irreducible to each other in the 
manner of Heidegger’s ontological difference. The insistence on the difference between the 
World and worlds distinguishes our approach from the influential rethinking of the 
Heideggerian concept of the world by Jean Luc Nancy. In the Sense of the World and the 
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Creation of the World (1997, 2007) Nancy operates with two notions of the world that 
resonate with our concepts of the world as a particular ordered totality and as the void of 
being. On the one hand, Nancy defines the world in the early Heideggerian and late 
Badiouan manner as a limited ‘totality of meaning’, giving such examples as ‘Debussy’s 
world’, ‘the hospital world’ or ‘the fourth world’ (Nancy, 2007: 41). On the other hand, 
Nancy also claims that the world is ‘in a sense, nothing’ (Nancy, 1997: 159) or ‘the growth 
of/from nothing’ (Nancy, 2007: 51), the ‘opening in which finite singularities dispose 
themselves’ (ibid.: 72). This world as void is the condition of possibility of the infinity of 
positive worlds, but is so neither as a foundation or an origin but simply by ‘weaving the co-
appearance of existences’ (ibid.: 70).  
 
However, Nancy then makes a striking move of identifying these two figures and thereby 
annulling the very idea of ontological difference: ‘the ontological difference is null. Being is: 
that the being exists.’ (Ibid.: 71) In other words, ‘the being is nothing more than being itself’ 
(Nancy, 2011: 59) Thus, the closed totality of the world ends up somehow identical to 
opening of the World that makes it possible, so that ‘the sense of the world is this world 
here as the place of existence.’ (Nancy, 1997: 56) With a clear allusion to Badiou’s Being and 
Event, Nancy claims that ‘there is neither being nor event, just existences with their comings 
and goings.’ (Nancy, 2007: 73). In his attempt to purge Heidegger’s philosophy of every 
trace of heroism and decisionism, Nancy opts for the utter trivialization of the theme of 
transcendence: Dasein is indeed ‘held out in the nothing’, yet this nothing is not ‘beyond 
existence’ but rather the everyday dwelling place of any Dasein whatsoever, which itself is 
now entirely indistinct from the ‘inauthentic’ beings that Heidegger disparagingly referred 
to as the ‘They’ (das Man) (Heidegger, 1962: 163-168; cf. Nancy, 2003: 50-52). The World is 
74 
 
this world here and nothing else.6 Nancy develops the theme of this identity in his 
reinterpretation of the idea of the creatio ex nihilo: 
 
[The] world is created from nothing: this does not mean fabricated with 
nothing by a particularly ingenious producer. It means instead that it is not 
fabricated, produced by no producer and not even coming out of nothing (like 
a miraculous apparition), but in a quite strict manner and more challenging for 
thought: the nothing itself. In creation, a growth grows from nothing and this 
nothing takes care of itself, cultivates its growth. The ex nihilo is the genuine 
formulation of a radical materialism, that is to say, precisely, without roots. 
(Nancy, 2007: 51) 
 
Thus, creatio ex nihilo means that the world is ‘all there’, that there is no other world or 
otherworldly supreme being behind it or, more precisely, what is behind it is the void from 
and of which the world grows (ibid.: 71-73). This world here as the positive totality of 
‘something’ is nothing but the growth from and of nothing itself, while this nothing is in turn 
nothing but the opening of and for this growth of something. Since for Nancy the 
ontological difference is null, the positivity of the world and the void of the World ultimately 
merge into a single figure of creatio ex nihilo, which may be approached either as the 
positivity of the created world or the facticity of the process of creation from/of nothing. 
‘This opening as nothing, which neither presents nor gives itself, is opened right at the same 
level of the finite singularities as their being together or their being-with and constitutes the 
disposition of the world.’ (Nancy, 2007: 73) Since, contrary to Badiou, Nancy does not draw 
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a distinction between being and appearance, the World (the being of something as nothing) 
and the world (the appearance of nothing as something) must remain indistinct.  
 
Nancy is certainly correct in emphasizing that the World as void is nothing ‘otherworldly’ in 
the mythical or theological sense and can only be accessed in ‘this world here’ as the 
condition of its very emergence, the ‘universal part’ that is ontologically always already 
there in any world whatsoever. This is the reason why in this book we shall retain the term 
World for the void at the risk of terminological confusion: to assert that there are worlds 
and there is the World is to emphasize that we are talking almost about the same thing, 
with the caveat that the World is precisely not a thing, not a being or a realm of beings and 
for this reason can never coincide with what it makes possible, remaining in excess of every 
positive world, transcending it from within as its ‘universal part’.  
 
It is this caveat that Nancy’s identification of the world and World obscures but which will 
be crucial for understanding the political significance of the concept of the World. As we 
shall demonstrate in detail in the following chapter, the possibility of world politics is 
conditioned by the disclosure of the World within positive worlds, which manifests the 
contingency of their transcendental orders and thereby opens these worlds to the 
possibility of transformation. It is evident that for this disclosure to be possible, the World 
and ‘this world here’ must be distinct. Moreover, the insistence on the identity of a given 
positive world and the World makes it difficult, if not outright impossible, to conceive of the 
possibility of the transformation of this world, the possibility that we conventionally 
associate with politics. If the World were simply this world here, without remainder or 
excess, how could one possibly confront what Nancy himself terms the ‘unworld’ ( immonde) 
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of contemporary politics, the ‘global’ agglomeration of worlds into a ‘glomus’, a tumorous 
growth of inequality, injustice and domination, which is closed off from the void that makes 
it possible into a suffocating self-immanence (Nancy, 2007: 33-34)? If the ‘unworld’ can be 
transformed into a better world, this is only because it is non-identical with the World and 
this non-identity may be brought to appearance within the ‘unworld’ itself, illuminating its 
contingency and hence the potentiality of its transformation. It is only because the World is 
not this world here (or any other positive world) that this world here is not all there is and, 
as the famous slogan goes, ‘another world is possible’. The World is that which, 
ontologically belonging to but not necessarily appearing in every positive world, conditions 
the possibility of every world’s becoming-otherwise. 
 
Let us now summarize the findings of this chapter and their implications for rethinking 
world politics. We began with the demonstration of the logical inconsistency of the 
understanding of the world as the Whole, which is at work in much of the contemporary 
discourse of world politics, both affirmative and critical. We then proceeded to the 
particularistic conception of the world, in which the world is understood as a limited totality 
regulated by a transcendental order. Finally, we have presented the concept of the World as 
the void, in which an infinite number of infinite worlds are disclosed. Rather than attempt to 
attain the universal on the basis of the particular, we have posited the void as the 
immediate and non-totalizable universal that makes possible an infinite multiplicity of 
particular worlds without prescribing their positive ontic order. While the concept of the 
world as the Whole reduced world politics to hegemony and imperialism and the idea of the 
infinity of worlds as limited totalities resigned us to relativism and nihilism, the concept of 
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the World as void at first glance appears to make the very concept of world politics a logical 
impossibility.  
 
It is clear that any politics derived from the World cannot affirm any principle or value that 
would derive from the positive order of any particular world, be it tradition or law, identity 
or culture. No particular being or realm of beings could be the source of such principles, 
whose only ground must be being itself, understood as the void of its own clearing. Yet, how 
can the void, i.e. literally nothing, found a politics and what content could such a politics 
possibly affirm? Our analysis of the three concepts of the world leaves us with three 
possible responses to this question. Firstly, it is possible to dismiss the concept of the World 
as void as nonsensical, abstruse or irrelevant and return to the familiar ritual of the 
affirmation of the world as the Whole and its denial in the particularistic pluralism of the 
international, whereby world politics continues to function as the impossible object, 
perpetually juggled by idealist and realist discourses without ever being grasped by either of 
them. Secondly, we may accept the concept of the World as the sole logically consistent 
construction of universality yet proceed to infer its irrelevance to politics due to its 
incapacity to ground any positive content. This solution, which we shall address in the 
following chapter in terms of nihilism, accepts the concept of the World and then denies the 
possibility of world politics precisely on the basis of this acceptance: since the World is void, 
world politics is impossible and there are only particular modes of politics in particular 
worlds. Finally, the third response consists in taking up the challenge of rethinking world 
politics on the basis of the concept of the World as void and ventures to derive universal 
principles of such politics from the disclosure of the World in particular worlds. As we have 
argued in the Introduction, what is at stake here is more than simply the relocation of the 
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familiar concept of politics to a different level or domain, but rather the redefinition of 
politics as such on the basis of the World, which alone prevents the inquiry into world 
politics from a relapse into the aporias of (inter)national politics. Thus, in the following 
chapter we shall develop the formal concept of politics articulated on the basis of the 
relation between the World and worlds, while in Part II we shall address the universal 
principles, derived from the disclosure of the World, that form the content of politics and 
present a typology of forms of politics developed on the basis of these principles.  
 
                                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 For a more detailed discussion of the set-theoretical notion of infinity, particularly in comparison with the 
Hegelian treatment of this theme, see Badiou (2008a: 106-112, 2005b: 161-170). 
2 This theorem (see Badiou 2005a: 84-86) demonstrates that there always exists at least one element of the 
power-set that is not an element of the initial set, i .e. there are more parts than there are elements. Its 
demonstration invokes Russell’s paradox of self-belonging: a set y of all  elements of a that do not belong to 
themselves is shown to belong to the power-set of a, but not to a itself, since the latter option would then 
invite the paradox of self-belonging that contradicts our initial definition of y. This theorem finds further 
elaboration in Cantor’s theorem that demonstrates that the cardinality of the power -set always exceeds the 
cardinality of the original set and the Cohen-Easton theorem that demonstrates that for infinite sets , which 
primarily concern us here, this excess is immeasurable. 
3 It is important to distinguish this logical argument about the infinity of worlds from the ontological argument 
about the infinity of sets. While all  worlds are infinite, it is obvious that not all  sets are infinite and that 
numerous finite multiplicities exist (the void set, singletons, etc.). In a transitional period between Being and 
Event and Logics of Worlds Badiou defines his assertion of the infinity of situations as a ‘modern axiom’, a 
‘conviction’ rather than a ‘deduction’, that seeks to transcend the discourse of finitude dominant in 20 th 
century philosophy (Badiou, 2005c: 182-183). Nonetheless, as long as the necessary infinity of situations is 
proclaimed on the ontological level, it remains problematic due to the abundance of evidence to the contrary. 
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After the publication of Logics of Worlds it is possible to separate this ‘axiom’ from ontological arguments as a 
phenomenological deduction of the necessary infinity of worlds that says nothing about the infinity of sets. 
See more generally Hallward (2003: 66-71). 
4 In a somewhat unkind endnote in Logics of Worlds, Badiou addresses the proximity between his 
phenomenology of worlds and Foucault’s archaeological analyses of epistemes and genealogical analyses of 
dispositifs only to argue, with a reference to an unpublished thesis by Cecile Winter, that ‘in Foucault there is 
no formal theory of the transcendental [and thus] empiricism prevails’. (Badiou, 2009b: 527) Notwithstanding 
this criticism, there is clearly a resonance between the objective phenomenology of worlds and Foucault’s 
analytics of government, insofar as both seek to reconstitute immanent ordering structures that condition the 
emergence of objects and subjects in a given world. What Foucault’s approach really lacks, in stark contrast 
with Badiou, is not so much a formal theory of the transcendental (Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1989) 
seems to contain at least prolegomena to such a theory) but an explicit ontology that would be a correlate to 
phenomenological analysis.  
5 While the theme of the nothing becomes particularly prominent in Heidegger’s writings after Being and Time, 
it is certainly not absent from his magnum opus. We need only recall  the discussion of conscience as the mode 
in which Dasein’s authentic potentiality for being is attested (1962: 312 -347). Not only does the call  of 
conscience say nothing, expressing itself ‘in the mode of keeping silent’ (ibid.: 318), but Dasein itself in the role 
of the ‘caller’ of conscience, ‘is definable in a ‘worldly’ way by nothing at all, [as] the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the 
‘nothing’ of the world’, [the Self] thrown into the nothing’ (ibid.: 321-322). Moreover, in the discussion of 
Dasein’s guilt Heidegger invokes the double nothingness or nullity of Dasein. Firstly, as a ‘thrown’ being Dasein 
always already finds itself delivered over to a certain field of possibil i ties that it has no power over; it exists as 
(and from) its own basis but this basis is itself negative and serves as a burden for Dasein. On the other hand, 
as a potential being that exists in the mode of projection Dasein chooses among these possibil ities but in 
choosing one of them necessarily negates all  the others. Thus, ‘[Dasein’s] being means, as thrown projection, 
being-the-basis of a nullity (and this being-the-basis is itself null).’ (Ibid.: 331) Thus, Dasein is the ‘null basis for 
its null projection, standing in the possibil ity of its being’ (ibid.: 333). This theme of double nullity evidently 
resonates with the two structural moments of boredom in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, being 
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left empty (the nullity of thrownness) and being hel d in l imbo (the nullity of projection) that define the 
disclosure of the World. 
6 In this reduction of the World to the world, Nancy arguably performs the inversion of the approach of Gilles 
Deleuze, which consists in the sublimation of ‘this world here’ (or any given world) to the status of the World 
or, in Deleuze’s terms, the Virtual. Any particular created world, endowed with an immanent positive order, 
may be restored to the dynamic status of the process of creation through what Peter Hallward calls 
‘despecification’ (Hallward, 2006: 161), the emptying out of its positive properties. The world is thus only 
perceived as the actual(ized) instance of the Virtual as the perpetual event of creation. Thus, while Nancy 
treats the World as our world, Deleuze treats our worlds as instances of the World. See more generally Badiou 
(2000: 43-53) and Hallward (2006: 27-53). 
